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Abstract—Cyber attacks are increasing in every aspect of daily
life. There are a number of different technologies around to
tackle cyber-attacks, such as Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS),
Intrusion Prevention Systems (IPS), firewalls, switches, routers
etc., which are active round the clock. These systems generate
alerts and prevent cyber attacks. This is not a straightforward
solution however, as IDSs generate a huge volume of alerts that
may or may not be accurate: potentially resulting in a large
number of false positives. In most cases therefore, these alerts
are too many in number to handle. In addition, it is impossible to
prevent cyber-attacks simply by using tools. Instead, it requires
greater intelligence in order to fully understand an adversary’s
motive by analysing various types of Indicator of Compromise
(IoC). Also, it is important for the IT employees to have enough
knowledge to identify true positive attacks and act according to
the incident response process.
In this paper, we have proposed a new threat intelligence
technique which is evaluated by analysing honeypot log data to
identify behaviour of attackers to find attack patterns. To achieve
this goal, we have deployed a honeypot on an AWS cloud to
collect cyber incident log data. The log data is analysed by using
elasticsearch technology namely an ELK (Elasticsearch, Logstash
and Kibana) stack.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cyber threat hunting is a complicated process for an or-
ganisation’s network administrator or security personnel. The
aim of threat hunting is to recognise cyber threats from alerts
generated by IDSs in corporate networks to protect valuable
assets. Understanding and mitigating cyber threats is a crucial
and complex process. Honeypot data analysis is one of the
ways to hunt for cyber threats. HoneyC [1], a low interaction
client-based honeypot, which emulates only essential features
of target clients. This is a client honeypot (HoneyC), which is
able to detect client side attacks. This is a client honeypots. In
essence it uses simulated clients to interact with real servers.
HoneyC is a platform-independent framework, which consists
of three main components: the Queuer, Visitor and an Analysis
Engine. SSH (Secure Shell) session honeypots are used for
experimental purpose. Honeypot is one method of developing
an understanding of any cyber-attack. More specifically, an
SSH honeypot is analysed whilst the session is running and
the data is visualised using a visual analytical technique [2]. In
addition, honeypots are used to mitigate Advanced Persistent
Threat (APT). APT works with a combination of human and
automated systems. The attacker in an APT does not jump
into any attack without initially conducting reconnaissance
and planning the attack. Jasek et. al [3] used honeypots to
detect cyber-attacks. Honeypots are excellent resource as they
give more resources to analysis for identification of cyber-
attack than other technologies. Honeypot data analysis finds
the anomalies to detect potential cyber-attack. Distributed
Denial of Service Attack (DDoS) is a challenging threat
for an organisation. Weiler [4] simulated the DDoS attack
using honeypots to learn more about such cyber attack on
network infrastructure. Honeypots are also able to emulate
mobile devices to understand the threat on smart phone. The
honeypots emulate real phone and collect data to understand
what kind of malware infect smart phones. Such honeypots are
called Nomadic [5], which provide infrastructure to collect
threat intelligence data. The monitoring is also carried out
by using visualisation techniques. A low interaction honeypot
called Dionaea is used to collect attack data and analyse
to understand the trend of cyber-attack [6]. They also build
individual attacker profile by analysing collected data.
It has been noticed that threat hunting is done by many
researchers by using honeypots data collection and analysis.
On the other hand, honeypots produce huge amount of data. It
is not easy for general-purpose data analysis tools to analyse
such amount of data. In this paper we invoke elasticsearch
technology to analyse honeypots data as it gives flexibility
of searching on any size of data set. It is well known that
honeypots and honeynets are unconventional security tools that
allow security personnel to collect data an analyse them to
learn more about cyber attack. In [7], authors collected data
from honeypots to hunt cyber attacks patterns. Honeypot data
is collected in by Moor et. al [8], which captured IP address
of attacker for further analysis.
There are a number of IDSs and IPSs available on the
market to protect networks, hosts and applications that form
part of an organisations information and technology assets.
These tools can be automated for finding and reducing threats.
However, automating cyber security tools are not the complete
solution for protecting valuable asset within an organisation.
The automation requires analysis of activities of the intruders
to provide better protection.
In this paper, we have proposed a new threat intelligence
approach. The threat intelligence technique is evaluated fol-
lowing collection of data. This is achieved by deploying
honeypots to find cyber-attack events through the analysis
of this data using elasticsearch technique. The results are
promising, thus demonstrating that honeypot data analysis
could be used in cyber threat intelligence instead of using
more traditional production systems.
In section II of this paper, we discuss a wide range of related
work for better understanding of existing cyber-threat hunting
techniques. In section III, we analyse cyber threat hunting and
propose a new threat intelligence model. We also provide an
initial conceptualisation to describe this formally. In section
IV, we setup and experiment using an ELK stack and discuss
the outcome. Finally, we summarise the paper and provide
future directions for this research.
II. RELATED WORK
Corporate networks are equipped with several security de-
vices such as traditional firewalls, IDS, IPS, anti-malware
software, traffic sniffers etc., to protect valuable assets. Most
of these devices are rule-base detection systems that allow or
reject traffic according to the rule-sets. On the other hand,
cyber security is a process not a product, which needs contin-
ued monitoring and improvement. Therefore, it is important to
think of advanced cyber threat handling in a more analytical
fashion. Hunting potential threats is a more advanced approach
than the traditional rule-base detection system [9].
Pursuing cyber threats is not a new concept. The threats
are usually modelled using various modelling techniques.
This acts as a support in attack situations and enables any
prevention strategy to consider a number of scenarios. There
are many cyber-attack modelling techniques used to analyse
cyber-attack such as: Attack Graphs or Trees [10] [11], Attack
Vectors [12], Attack Surface [13], Diamond model [14], the
OWASP’s threat model [15] and the Kill Chain[16], [17].
These modelling techniques can be used individually or in
conjunction with other models. In [18] a number of cyber
attack modelling techniques developed to handle cyber attacks
efficiently were discussed. Cyber attack modelling is mainly
concerned with identifying the attack patterns of the adversary.
On the other hand, cyber threat hunting is a process of
monitoring, data collection and analysis of event data to find
anomalies. It also deals with the visualisation techniques,
linked data analysis and model building [19].
A. Pyramid of Pain
The Pyramid of Pain (PoP) was introduced by Binaco [9],
which analyses how an IoC behaves. The idea of an IoC is that
it identifies a comprise of some network-related components
that usually are used to perform cyber attacks. The main idea
of the PoP is to establish the different levels of IoC for cyber
defence. From the bottom up, the pyramid indicates the level
of difficulty for handling cyber threats. So, the IoC defines the
components of the PoP.
Figure 1 shows the PoP, which gives more levels of technical
difficulty for both the adversary and the victim. PoP provides
a simplified view of the adversarys activities on the system.
An adversary uses the PoP components for developing an
attack on a network. In addition, in a cyber-attack, an ad-
versary generally leaves some form of footprint which could
be the combination of the PoP components. So, analysing
a PoP could reveal the nature and motive of an adversary,
which could be used to take informed decisions for threat
intelligence. The trivial metric of the pyramid is at the bottom
called the hash value. Hash values provide unique reference for
specific malware or to the payload that is used for the attack.
Hash values can be changed, for example, a minor change to
the payload changes the hash. So, it is not worth keeping track
of them as new values are more often continually generated.
This means that attacks using hash values are easily identified
and tackled, so, the possibility of a system compromise is
very low. In any cyber-attack incident, IP addresses are very
basic indicators for identifying an attacker. It is hard to hide
IP addresses during a cyber-attack event. For an attacker, it
is very easy to change the IP address after and attack or
masquerade before an attack takes place. In practice it is not
feasible to pursue every single IP address that has tried to
breach a system.
To get a domain name however, the adversary must have
registered with a hosting company. It is relatively easy to trace
back to the origin of the domain; although attackers could be
disguised. On the other hand, domain names can be changed
at anytime. Since domain name suers have to register, it is
more difficult to change domain names in comparison to IP
addresses. The next indicator is the network artefact, which
could differentiate the malicious activities of the adversary
from that of legitimate users. Hosts that are involved in a cyber
attack, often contain a great deal of information about the
attack. Host artefacts are the indicators of malicious activities
performed within the host. These can be used to distinguish the
activities of the legitimate user and the adversary. One of the
difficulties in terms of IoC is the tools used by the adversary
to make an attack. These tools which are used to deploy or
plant the payload can be software or hardware based in in
effect a combination of both new or customised tools can be
a great challenge for the analyst. Therefore, tools could be a
difficult IoC. The final and top component of the pyramid is
Tactics, Techniques and Procedure (TTPs). This is the level
where the behaviour of the adversary can be identified from
the malicious software or the payload.
B. Hunting Maturity Model (HMM)
This is a cyber-threat hunting model, that identifies an
organisations threat hunting ability including quantity and
quality of threat data collection. HMM also indicates way
Fig. 1. Pyramid of Pain (Extracted from [9])
TABLE I
HUNTING MATURITY MODEL
Level Maturity Comment
Level 0 Initial Depend on automated alerting
Level 1 minimal Incorporate threat intelligence
Level 2 Procedural Follow data analysis produced by others
Level 3 Innovative Create new data analysis technique
Level 4 Leading Automate the successful data analysis proce-
dure
of analysing and visualising data [19]. This hunting model
consists of five levels of maturity. The first level, which is level
0, is where organisations mainly rely on third-party automated
alerting systems. In this level, very little or no data is collected.
The maturity levels go up depending on how organisations
collect data, analyse data and incorporate them into cyber
threat analysis. In this context, the highest level means that
the organisation uses very high levels of routine data collection
and automated systems for data analysis. Figure 2 the HMM,
which is linear in nature. The main idea behind the HMM is
that it requires continuous improvement.
Fig. 2. Hunting Maturity Model (Adapted from [19])
Threat hunting is not a one off action, it is a process. It
depends on many criteria such as the creation of a hypothesis,
investigation of tools and techniques, identification of new
patterns and enriched analytics. The Sqrrl Data [19] introduced
the hunting loop as shown in figure 3. The loop components
can be matched with the hunting maturity model to identify
the strength of the company’s data collection analysis. If the
process works for a hunting threat, it could be automated and
shared with other team members for tackling similar types of
cyber-threats.
The HMM process is conducted in the following steps:
• Data Collection - To hunt real threats within the network
or host collecting data is the most important task. Data
could be collected from different sources. These data
could be different types such as syslog, honeypots data,
firewall data, server logs etc., which could be used for
creating a hypothesis. In most cases data collection
could be automated, which could be fed into an analytic
system or into the visualisation software.
• Hypothesis Creation - If existing alert based systems
such as IDS, IPS, SIEM (Security Incident Event
Management) or Firewalls do not find a real threat, it
is important to review and analyse historical data to
develop a new hypothesis. The hypothesis needs to be
reviewed frequently within a typical network. Once a
genuine threat is identified, the hypothesis needs to be
reviewed and improved. In addition, a new hypothesis
may be introduced depending on the cyber incident event.
• Tools and Techniques for Hypothesis Techniques - From
the data collection to automation, there are many tools
and techniques required to hunt a cyber threat. Basic
log analysis tools or SIEM gives a minimal level of
flexibility for mature hunting. A hypothesis must be
tested against the tools and techniques used for threat
hunting. In most cases advanced levels of visualisation
should aid to test and create a new hypothesis.
• Pattern & TTP Detection - APT [3] or Zero Day Attacks
[20] are difficult to identify or predict in advance.
This is especially the case for a Zero Day attack
as this does not match any known attack pattern. It is
important to create patterns for identifying typical attacks
and to keep looking for new and emerging threat patterns.
• Analytic Automation - Cyber threat hunting involves a
number of tools and techniques. It is almost impossible
to manage all these tools manually. Automation plays a
key factor in such situations. The threat hunting process
from data collection to detection needs instead to be
automated for efficiently managing cyber threat incident
events.
C. Matrix of IoC
The IoC can be put in a form of a matrix. Each of
the indicators is evaluated using three criteria such as trace,
identify and throttle. In the following we discuss three criteria
against IoC for better understanding of those indicators.
• Trace - It is important to trace an attacker during their
visit to a network or a host. Tracing a hash value is not
Fig. 3. Threat Hunting Loop (Extracted from [19])
entirely beneficial as values could be changed by the
attacker during the next attack. On the other hand, if the
payload is changed, the hash value will be different. IT
is therefore difficult to identify if any subsequent attack
is performed by the same attacker. An IP address is the
key in making a connection between devices as each of
the devices within the network must have an IP address.
The attacker may change the IP address every time they
do an attack, which is also true for domain names. On
the other hand, the attacker may leave a network or
host artefact although they have changed IP address or
domain name. So, these networks or host artefacts are
important elements to investigate further. Some users
utilise same tool repeatedly to conduct a cyber attack,
as changing the attack tool may require development
and testing, which could be expensive. So, tools could
be used to identify attackers whether they are using the
same tool or not. In the top of the pyramid, the TTP
is the most important and difficult indicator. Since TTP
mainly expresses the skills and training of the attackers,
they may improve their skill-set over time, which makes
threat hunters thinking hard about attackers’ next actions .
• Identify - Tracing helps threat hunters to identify the
foot-print of an attacker. Any evidence left by the
attacker could be used to identify the attacker in a future
attempt. For example, tracking systems can be used to
match identified components such as IP address, hash
values and domain name. Identifying the network or
host artefact could help in analysing attack behaviour.
• Response - If a threat is traced and identified, it is
required to prevent future events from happening. For
example, if an IP address is identified as a threat element
from data analysis, it could be black-listed for any
future events. If quick response is made to the identified
TABLE II
PYRAMID OF PAIN IN PRACTICE
Criteria Trace Identify Response
Hash Value Easy Easy Easy
IP Address Easy Easy Easy
Domain Names Easy Easy Easy
Network Artefacts Medium Medium Medium
Host Artefacts Medium Medium Medium
Tools Hard Hard Hard
TTP Hard Hard Hard
element, the defence becomes offence [9].
III. THREAT HUNTING ANALYSIS
Cyber threat analysis is the key to threat hunting. Cyber
threat hunting is a process of searching potential cyber threats
through the network by analysing relevant data-sets. Data
analysis could be performed by using existing automated tools
or alternatively be performed manually. In an organisation,
cyber threat hunting maturity depends on the ability of data
collection and analysis [19]. Data could be historical or live,
depending on the most valuable source to identify cyber
threats. Threat data could be collected by using honeypots
and analysed to understand threats before they occur [21].
Data also contains details of a cyber security incident that
has happened. Analysing such data gives an indication that
most of security incidents do not occur as zero-day attacks
[20], they are quite frequent and in most cases have patterns.
Appropriate data collection and analysis could lead to many
elements of IoC.
To maximise hunting, we have installed two low-interaction
honeypots called Kippo and Dionaea [22] on Amazon cloud
services. We have collected over 500MB of Kippo log data.
The log data consists of all the login attempts onto the
honeypots. The log also comes with timestamps that indicate
when the event took place.
Before we analyse the honeypots log data, we propose a
cyber-threat intelligence model, which will help us to un-
derstand the collected data efficiently. In the following sub-
section, we have defined the conceptual model and derived a
formal definition of that proposed model.
A. Threat Intelligence
The following is the conceptual diagram of cyber-attack
recognition. There are three main components:
• Attack
• Behaviour
• Pattern
An attack is a systematic approach by an attacker to gain
access in to a system, a network or a host. An attack is
originated from anattacker on to a system, which can be
recorded using data collection. The behaviour of the attacker
can be identified from the data collected if the same attacker
attempted several attacks. In any event, an attacker is a human
or a machine. For both cases the behaviour is an indicator of
Fig. 4. Cyber-attack Concept
the method used. So, there is a good relationship between
human behaviour and cyber attacks [23].
Generally, system log data collection is performed for most
of the system. These data can be considered as big data as
the data has velocity, verity and volume [24]. If we consider
only the volume of the data set, it would require special
techniques to analyse and present. By analysing these data
we can identify attack events. These attack events could occur
repeatedly over time, which could form pattern. The aim of
using data analysis is to identify such a pattern. Data can be
analysed more intelligently and efficiently by using big data
analysis techniques.
The main idea of the triangle in Figure 4 is that a cyber
incident data-set contains attack data, which can be analysed
using data analysis. Attack data can be separated from normal
incidents and presented in a more readable format.
So, in this context the attack performed by the attackers
reveals the behaviour of the attackers. By adding intelligence
such as data analysis, to these two components we can identify
attack patterns. Attack patterns could be the key to preventing
future cyber-attacks.
So, in this context the attack performed by the attackers
reveal the behaviour of the attackers. By adding intelligence
such as data analysis, to these two components we can identify
attack pattern. Attack pattern could be the key to prevent future
cyber-attack.
B. Problem Analysis
An initial conceptualisation of the cyber-attack is describe
as follows.
A cyber-attack is originated by an adversary from a remote
location. An attack will have one of two outcomes: a) suc-
cessful, which means the victims system was compromised
or, b) unsuccessful, which means the victims system was not
compromised.
An attack can be defined as a set of actions {a1, a2, a3,
. . ., an} taken by an adversary by using some tools and
techniques to access valuable assets. The attack is performed
through the Internet, which is an interconnected network. A
cyber-attack can be considered as a directed graph (V , E),
where vertices V stands for nodes and edges E for a path. In
the event of an unsuccessful attack the path remains a single
direction. On the other hand, if the attack is successful, the
system is compromised and, the path becomes bi-directional.
The Internet consists a heterogenous topology, however we are
only interested in the abstract edges and vertices. Our main
interest in the vertices are that they identify the attackers and
victims machines. In a victims machine or network, the data,
which we will call assets could be in three different stages.
Assets X = {Xr, Xp, Xm}, which represents that
• the asset is resting (Xr),
• the asset is in process (Xp) and
• the asset is on the move respectively (Xm).
Let us assign T ⊆ R+0 as a time-stamp. We define a node
function which for an asset and time-stamp returns the node.
The node is represented by the symbol ⊥, which implies that
an asset is on the move. Formally, node : X×T → V ∪{⊥}.
So, for the resting asset x ∈ Xr, where node(x,t) is constant,
i.e., the value does not depend on the time-stamp. On the other
hand, Xp and Xm are dependent on the time-stamp.
Let assume that in the event of a cyber-incident, an attack
starts at time t and lasts for 4t. Given the time-stamp, we
have formalised cyber-incident as follows -
attack - an attacker comes to the contact of the victim’s
system at time t and leaves at time δt. The elapse time may
vary depending on the activities of the attacker on the victim’s
machine or network.
access - attacker tries to access victim’s asset by using some
techniques such as brute force. If the attacker is successful for
gaining accessing, he/she can advance towards the goal.
IV. EXPERIMENT SETUP
This section describes the experiment setup using the ELK1
stack. The ELK stack consists of Elasticsearch, Logstash and
Kibana, which helps to present data, create visualisation and a
dashboard for any size of data. One of the advantages of using
elasticsearch technology is that scalability is not issue. ELK
can handle any size of data and search is faster. To support the
ELK we used Filebeat to get multiple files to the elasticsearch.
Figure 5 illustrates the architecture of the experiment. We have
collected more than 500MB of honeypot log data for more than
one year through an Amazon Web Services (AWS) cloud. We
setup two honeypots called Kippo and Dionea, where kippo
is a low-high and Dionea is medium honeypot. Both of the
honeypots appear as real operating systems, which attracts
many attackers. These log data contains a time-stamp and
a date of any events. Events are recorded if anyone tries to
interact with the honeypot. The log data is huge in size, which
is very difficult to analyse simply by looking at the log files.
So, we adapted the ELK in order to find the meaning of the
log data. The main advantage of ELK is that it combines elas-
ticsearch and visualisation. Since, the elasticsearch is highly
scalable, it can search within any size of data. It can also do all
1https://www.elastic.co/
relevant database operations such as create, read, update and
delete. It can also connect with different types of Application
Programming Interfaces (APIs) for searching and analysing
data. Elasticsearch is used by many organisations such as:
Wikipedia for full text searching, which is called search- as-
you-type; GitHub uses it for searching 130 billion lines of
code; and Stack Overflow uses it for full text searching for
geo- location queries. It is not only used by technology giants,
but also by many startups for finding a meaning within data
[25].
Fig. 5. Experiment Setup with ELK Stack
A. Data Analysis using Kibana
In Kibana, we performed a number of keyword searches
using elasticsearch. The main goal was to find attack events
in our honeypots. We have identified a number of events from
the log data anaysis. The Figure 6 illustrates the attack events
in the Kippo honeypot. We identified eight keywords, which
can be recognised as events that occurred in the honeypots.
It should be noted that all the events are not attack-related.
It has been recognised that six of the keywords are attack-
related and the rest such as remote error and connection lost,
are not related to any cyber attack. In Figure 7 attack data is
Fig. 6. Kippo Honeypot Log Event Visualisation using Kibana
summarised according to the keywords found in the log data.
It shows that each of the attacks happen within the honeypot.
We know that attackers of the honeypot do not have any
idea that they are interacting with a honeypot system. This
can indicate the frequency of an attack in relationship to a
legitimate system.
The result has been summarised in table III to identify
the statistics of those events that occurred. We identified that
root trying auth none occurred some 3,839,723 times which,
is about 23.57% of the total number of events found up to
this point of data collection. Since the honeypots are Linux
Fig. 7. Attack Events
TABLE III
ATTACK EVENTS ANALYSIS
Event Name No of time
occurred
% of occur-
ring
login attempt 1, 889, 046 11.6%
root trying auth none 3, 839, 723 23.57%
root failed auth password 3, 172, 791 19.48%
root trying auth password 3, 172, 791 18.91%
unauthorised login 1, 889, 046 11.6%
got remote error 726, 436 4.46%
got channel direct-tcpip
request
351, 466 2.16%
connection lost 1, 342, 279 8.24%
machines, the attackers try to access root. The second event
is the root failed auth password, which occurred 3,172,791
times; or a total of 19.48%., This is another attack event
where attackers are trying to access the machine by using
some sort of brute force attack. The frequency of attacks
indicate that in any moment of time, attackers are trying to
gain access to the system. Many different types of attacks are
identified by analysing the log data. One such attack event
was an attempt to got channel direct-tcpip request, which
is used to create an SSH tunnel with the system. All these
keywords that are identified during the honeypot data analysis
are elements that could be very important for threat hunters
for finding intelligence. This gives an important message that
an attacker tries various techniques on honeypot unknowingly
as they believe that this is a real system.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have introduced a new threat intelligence
model, which indicates that attack, behaviour and patterns are
a relevant and important concern to all organisations. It is
equally important in our understanding of a cyber attack to
understand the behaviour of attackers. Consequently, attack
pattern can be identified from the attack and behaviour. The
model works only when there are a significant number of
network incident related data for analysis. We have analysed
cyber threat intelligence by using honeypot data collected from
AWS. The data is analysed using an ELK stack for log data
visualisation. It is worth noting that ELK uses elasticsearch,
which helps to identify various types of cyber incident events.
It has become apparent that honeypots are constantly being
targeted by attackers. Most of the attacks are similar in kind as
attackers attempt to gain access to the system. This experiment
into honeypot data for cyber intelligence is valuable as it can
be used to identify and mitigate future cyber attacks. The main
advantage of using honeypot data for threat intelligence is that
there is no side effect on the production system. This kind of
analysis could help to build future IDS and IPS for production.
In future work, we aim to extend the cyber attack model.
One of the dimensions of this extension could be setting up
honeypots to extract attack data. These attack data could be
analysed by using appropriate tools to find attack patterns.
The resulting patterns could be used to train IDS and IPS
systems to automate future processes. These attack patterns
could be used to implement cyber threat hunting techniques
for a better understanding of cyber attacks. APTs are one of
the issues in a cyber security environment [26]. In this case,
a group of attackers use full planning advanced infrastructure
and capability to attack a corporate network. This is a growing
and challenging issue for businesses and governments alike.
Another dimension of this research could be to further develop
the model for analysing APTs using honeypots data and attack
modelling techniques.
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